The U.S.-Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement, explained
- Michael MacArthur Bosack
- Jun 29
- 11 min read
Representatives of Israel, the United States, and Lebanon sign the Framework Agreement in Washington, D.C., 26 June 2026 (screen capture via the U.S. State Department)
On 26 June in Washington, D.C., representatives of the United States, Israel, and Lebanon signed a framework agreement. Their stated objective was for the deal to move Israel and Lebanon closer to resolving the bilateral hostilities that erupted following the outbreak of the U.S.-Israel-Iran War. However, what the three sides produced through their multiple rounds of negotiations was an agreement centered more on defining the political and security conditions necessary for eventual normalization of relations between Israel and Lebanon than on measures that will resolve the immediate conflict, particularly as it relates to the broader war with Iran.
The agreement seeks to deepen the wedge between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (and, by extension, Iran) to advance the bilateral peace process. Essentially, it delivers the promise that a Lebanon without Hezbollah will have its territory restored and international backing to become a safer and more prosperous nation. The framework agreement centers on displacing Hezbollah with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), allowing the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to remain in southern Lebanon until the Lebanese government can demonstrate effective control and dismantling of Hezbollah's military infrastructure, with U.S. and Arab backing.
Evaluating the future direction of the Israel-Lebanon peace process begins with an analysis of the framework agreement, its potential utility, and the prospects for implementation. This requires examining the negotiations that produced the agreement, its key provisions, and the factors likely to influence the next stage of the peace process.
Background on conflict-related negotiations
Israel has maintained a hardline approach towards Lebanon since the outset of Operation ROARING LION—its named military operation against Iran. Immediately following the initiation of offensive strikes, the Benjamin Netanyahu administration warned that any violence from Hezbollah would be reciprocated.
Thus, on 2 March, when Hezbollah forces began firing upon Israel in support of Iran, the IDF escalated military operations against Lebanon. Israeli forces struck dozens of Hezbollah targets from the air, and, on the ground, the IDF entered areas of southern Lebanon to achieve what they termed an “enhanced forward defense posture.” Notably, these included areas that the Israeli government had determined were tied to the 7 October Hamas attack (a point that will later be important when considering the politics of potential IDF withdrawal).
At the onset of hostilities, the Israeli government demonstrated no interest in negotiating with Lebanese counterparts. Instead, the Netanyahu administration expanded occupied areas—which they have labeled “security zones”—and continued persistent strikes against Hezbollah targets in the country.
An IDF graphic depicting Israeli occupied areas of southern Lebanon, termed “security zones” (photo via X/Twitter @IDF)
It was at the behest of the United States that representatives from Israel and Lebanon came together for talks, in large part because Iran had tied its peace process with the White House to a full ceasefire across all fronts including Lebanon. The U.S. State Department brought together the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors to America for negotiations beginning in mid-April and extending until the signing of the framework agreement.
Five rounds of negotiations took place intermittently between April and June, interspersed with ceasefire pledges. Two days after the first round of talks concluded on 14 April, President Donald Trump announced a 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The second round took place on 23 April, whereby the parties agreed to a three week extension of their ceasefire. During this period, there was never a complete cessation of hostilities in place. Rather, Hezbollah continued its drone and rocket attacks, while the IDF expanded ground operations and continued strikes against Hezbollah targets.
Amid the ongoing tit-for-tat military strikes and Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, U.S. counterparts hosted the two sides for the third and fourth round of negotiations on 15 May and 2-3 June. They eventually agreed to reconvene on 22 June.
In the intervening weeks, Iranian support for Lebanon hardened, while U.S. patience with Israel wore thin. Tehran maintained its immutable position that peace between the United States and Iran could not be achieved without peace for Lebanon, and on multiple occasions, Iranian officials publicly called upon U.S. counterparts to restrain their ally in Jerusalem.
Representatives of Israel (left), the United States (center), and Lebanon (right) meet in Washington, D.C., 15 May 2026 (photo via the U.S. State Department)
Meanwhile, as Washington was working hard to conclude and implement the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding,” Israel’s continued retaliatory strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian targets began to draw the ire of Trump and his administration. Multiple reports confirmed details of a phone call between Trump and Netanyahu in which the U.S. president called his Israeli counterpart “f—cking crazy” and added, “You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me.” Vice President JD Vance also delivered public signals of the White House’s frustration towards Israeli hardliners, with Trump adding that Israel does not have to “knock down a building every time somebody walks into it that’s from Hezbollah.”
Against this backdrop, the fifth round of negotiations took place last week, which proved to be the most intensive series of deliberations between the parties thus far. The parties used the entire week to finalize the details of the framework agreement that was signed on Friday, but reports indicate that the negotiations were heated and challenging. Nevertheless, the three parties managed to conclude a 14-point document for signature.
Breaking down the framework agreement
The agreement is composed of fourteen paragraphs spanning just a few pages. Given the relatively short length of the memorandum, it is reasonable to go through each of the provisions here to gain a more thorough understanding of its terms and conditions. The breakdown is as follows:
Type of agreement: Framework agreement
A framework agreement establishes pledges and expectations for proceeding with negotiation and/or implementation of provisions related to peace processes. Importantly, framework agreements tend to leave out critical features of armistices or peace treaties, essentially putting off these elements for negotiation and implementation in future efforts.
Paragraph 1: Recognition of right to exist and commitment to continued negotiations
This provision is most notable for Israel, since it includes Lebanon’s formal declaration that Israel is a sovereign state with the right to exist. This is a foundational step towards normalization of bilateral relations. The provision does not include a recognition of sovereign territory, likely because of the continued Israeli occupation, but it acknowledges the negotiation process and includes a pledge from the parties to continue deliberations.
Paragraph 2: Conditions for IDF withdrawal
This paragraph essentially claims that Lebanon does not have sovereign control over its southern territories; rather, that it falls under the control of Hezbollah which is what necessitates IDF presence. Accordingly, Israel declares that the IDF will withdraw with a strong caveat: “pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure.” Further, it notes that specific rules for the withdrawal of Israeli forces are contained in an unreleased security annex to the framework agreement.
Paragraph 3: Creation of “pilot zones”
To facilitate IDF withdrawal, the framework agreement calls for the creation of two “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon whereby IDF transfers control to the LAF. It prescribes implementation of two areas to “serve as the mechanism for phased and verified redeployments of the IDF and the deployments of the LAF.” The two areas are indicated in red in the image below, with the yellow line representing the boundary between Lebanon and Israeli-occupied areas:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers remarks about the Framework Agreement, noting the two “pilot zones” circled in red (photo via X/Twitter @IsraeliPM)
Paragraph 4: Expulsion of hostile proxies in Lebanon
This paragraph calls for Lebanon to restore and exercise “full sovereignty over all its territory,” including the “complete and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups,” and ensuring that “such groups will have no military or security role and no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon.” It includes an invitation from Lebanon for support from the international community, “particularly Arab partners, under the leadership of the United States.”
Paragraph 5: Israeli security guarantee
This is a pledge that Israeli military actions are solely predicated on responses to non-state armed groups; particularly, Hezbollah. It includes Israel’s declaration that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon.
Paragraph 6: Assertion of Lebanese sovereign authority
This provision declares Lebanon’s exclusive responsibility to make war and peace. Essentially, it is a rejection of Iran and Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanese security and sovereignty.
Paragraph 7: Right to self-defense & the establishment of an oversight mechanism
This paragraph declares that both Israel and Lebanon have the right to defend themselves, reaffirming that no third party may exercise that right on their behalf. It also prescribes the establishment of a “military coordination group” with U.S. participation to ensure implementation of the Framework Agreement.
Paragraph 8: Affirmation of intent for a secure, independent Lebanon
Here, the parties declare that they “share the objective of a secure, rebuilt Lebanon…in which no non-state armed group poses a threat to Israel, Lebanon, or citizens of either country.” It recognizes the importance of LAF deployments supplanting IDF in southern Lebanon.
Paragraph 9: Performance-based sequencing for Israeli withdrawal
Following the paragraph 2 caveat on IDF withdrawal, this paragraph includes Lebanon’s commitment to a “rigorous, performance-based program” aimed at restoring “full military and security control within Lebanon.” It calls for U.S. assistance, with the condition that such assistance will be “strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones and full transparency.”
The Israeli flag flying over occupied Beaufort Fort in southern Lebanon, 31 May 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @manniefabian)
Paragraph 10: Encouraging international support to Lebanon
In this paragraph, the United States pledges to rally international partners for reconstruction support, humanitarian assistance, and economic recovery and investment for Lebanon.
Paragraph 11: Blocking funds to non-state armed groups
Lebanon and the U.S. pledge to prevent funding of any entity affiliated with non-state armed groups and to use all legal mechanisms available to address it. Lebanon further promises that none of the reconstruction or development funds it receives will go to non-state armed groups (namely, Hezbollah).
Paragraph 12: Creation of working groups
This provision calls for the creation of working groups for implementation, facilitated by the United States. There are no further details on the composition, functions, or mechanics of these working groups.
Paragraph 13: Good faith approaches in international settings & detainee release
Here, Israel and Lebanon pledge to operate in good faith in all international “political or legal fora,” essentially calling for a normalization of diplomatic behaviors towards each other. This paragraph also includes the commitment to identify detainees and facilitate their release. It offers no additional information on detainee release, but given its placement in this paragraph, the agreement suggests that this activity should be carried out in accordance with international rules and practices rather than separate arrangements.
Paragraph 14: Acknowledgment of U.S. support
This extraneous inclusion adds nothing to the agreement; rather, it simply offers praise for the United States and Donald Trump’s “vision and leadership.”
Collectively, these provisions reveal three central objectives: to transfer security responsibility from Hezbollah to the Lebanese state, to condition Israeli withdrawal on measurable security benchmarks, and to align international reconstruction assistance with Lebanon’s consolidation of sovereign authority.
A tangled implementation process
Like the U.S.-Iran peace memorandum that was concluded before, this framework agreement contains problems that affect its implementability, but these are political rather than based on the design of the agreement itself.
In some respects, it is a potentially transformative instrument that could provide the basis for moving Israel and Lebanon toward a new, future-oriented relationship. This is why President Trump called Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to congratulate him on the agreement, and why Aoun characterized the agreement as the “first step on the path toward Lebanon restoring its sovereignty over all its territory, complete and undiminished.” Even Netanyahu praised the agreement as a “major blow to Iran.”
But whatever political enthusiasm there may be, there are four major problems associated with this framework agreement:
(1) Internal fracturing. The agreement offers significant concessions to Israel with very few guaranteed returns unless Lebanon can successfully expel Hezbollah and eliminate Iranian influence. This will not sit well with some Lebanese groups, and the agreement already elicited protests from Hezbollah supporters and ardent opponents to engagement with Israel. Whether Beirut can mend internal divisions as it attempts to root out Hezbollah is uncertain, with concerns in Jerusalem and Washington over the potential for fracturing to trigger another Lebanese civil war.
Protests broke out in Beirut following the announced signing of the U.S.-Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement, 26 June 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @DavidSaranga)
But there are also challenges on the Israeli side. The country’s Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, called the framework agreement a “big mistake,” noting that he will “continue to fight in the cabinet and the government against this bad agreement.” Ben-Gvir is not alone in his opinion among Israeli policy circles, who have called for Israel to be the sole arbiter for disarmament and demobilization of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Netanyahu has already taken steps to assuage concerns over the agreement, but Hezbollah ceasefire violations and external dynamics in the U.S.-Iran peace process could contribute to further Israeli opposition to the newly signed agreement.
(2) Enduring Israeli occupation. The language of the agreement calls for the complete, verifiable disarmament of non-state armed groups and total restoration of control under Lebanese Armed Forces before the IDF withdraws. Israel’s approach to Gaza offers insight into why this is problematic, as Hamas still has not disarmed and the IDF remains in occupied areas months after the U.S. government convened the inaugural Board of Peace meeting to herald the transition to phase 2 peace process implementation. The Netanyahu administration will likely hold firm on an “all-or-nothing” approach, especially since Netanyahu has already promised that the IDF would not withdraw from southern Lebanon as long as he is prime minister.
(3) Entanglement with the U.S.-Iran peace process. While the framework agreement is positioned as a stepping stone towards normalization of bilateral relations between Israel and Lebanon, Iran and Hezbollah maintain that the two peace processes are integrated. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem declared that the framework agreement is “null and void, and instead the provisions of the Iranian-American Memorandum of Understanding must be implemented.” He added, “The Lebanese government, through this agreement, has legitimized the continued presence of the Zionist occupiers in Lebanon for several years.” Meanwhile, the Iranian foreign ministry responded to the framework agreement by demanding a timetable for IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, reiterating its position that termination of hostilities against Lebanon continues to be one of its principal interests in its dealings with the United States.
Given these positions, Tehran could hold the U.S.-Iran peace process hostage over the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, in turn creating a no-win situation for the White House. Under this circumstance, the White House either reneges on some of the provisions from the Framework Agreement, which will likely lead to Israel taking a more aggressive approach in Lebanon; or it jeopardizes progress in the U.S.-Iran peace process, bolstering Iranian hardliners.
Images from U.S. strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks on civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, published 28 June 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @CENTCOM)
(4) U.S.-Iran example setting. The junior allies in Israel and Hezbollah will pay attention to the behaviors of the United States and Iran in their own peace process. For them, the manner in which the White House and Tehran respond to violations and setbacks can be used as justification for their own actions. This notably includes the recent tit-for-tat escalation cycle between the United States and Iran, which signals to the allies that an eye-for-an-eye approach is acceptable behavior. If the White House intends for its Israeli ally to respond more delicately to incidents, it will need to consider more tempered approaches in its peace process with Tehran.
* * * * *
This framework agreement represents a milestone achievement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, but there are serious challenges that await the two sides in the implementation phase. The parties will need to figure out how to extricate the Israel-Lebanon peace process from U.S.-Iran ceasefire efforts, or at least gain Tehran’s acceptance that there will not be a near-term withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Lebanese government must navigate the tricky dual path of bolstering internal governance while rooting out Iran’s hostile proxies—an effort that could trigger domestic unrest in addition to renewed hostilities with Israel. In short, the path ahead is uncertain, with the framework agreement serving as a tenuous road map to help navigate the way.
Michael MacArthur Bosack is a seasoned international negotiator and the founder of the Parley Policy Institute. He is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Previously, Michael served as the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. He is a former East-West Center Fellow, a military veteran, and the author of “Negotiate: A Primer for Practitioners.”
Cable No. 65
Full text of the U.S.-Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement
