How the U.S.-Israel-Iran War ends

Michael MacArthur Bosack
2 days ago
5 min read

Screen capture of the U.S. attack on an Iranian drone carrier, published 6 March 2026 (image via U.S. CENTCOM)

On 28 February, the Israeli and U.S. militaries initiated military strikes against Iran, eliminating key elements of the country’s military and political leadership while attempting to disable its armed forces. The Iranians responded with counter strikes across the region aimed at degrading its enemies’ military capabilities and imposing political and economic costs.

As the war proceeds into its second week, there is one key question on many minds:

How does the U.S.-Israel-Iran War end?

Fundamentally, wars only end in one of five ways, so the best approach to assessing the answer is to examine each of the possible options.

Possible outcomes

The first way a war may end is through conquest.

In other words, one side in the conflict completely takes control of the opposing side’s territory and subjugates the residents of that land. While the White House has not entirely ruled out “boots on the ground,” waging a war of conquest is neither politically tenable nor something the U.S. military is resourced to achieve amid other security priorities.

The second way is disengagement.

In other words, the parties to conflict simply stop military operations. This decision often comes with announcements declaring “mission accomplished” or “achieving all our objectives.” Conversely, a belligerent may just quietly retreat its forces.

In this war, the White House has identified four objectives that will inform whether it is ready to disengage from the war effort: (1) destroy Iran’s missile capabilities; (2) eliminate Iran’s Navy; (3) ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon; and (4) disable Iranian support to hostile proxies.

Meanwhile, while Tel Aviv is broadly aligned with these four objectives, the Benjamin Netanyahu government has made clear that there is an additional goal: regime change. That was the main focus of Israel’s intelligence collection and initial attacks. In fact, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz recently revealed that the government had decided in November 2025 that it would kill Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

As for Iran, the country is on the defensive, and the objective for the government is simply regime survival. This means Tehran will continue prosecuting the war effort until the U.S. and Israel disengage. Iran’s armed forces will seek to sow as much chaos as possible to force that disengagement.

The third way that wars end is through a de facto surrender.

This is not a formal surrender, but it is tantamount to one. In this case, one side capitulates to the other, only they do not call it a surrender. Rather, they may call it a joint declaration, an armistice, a ceasefire, or any number of other terms. The point is that one side subjugates itself to the demands of the other.

This is likely the option that the White House is currently pursuing in this war. D.C.-based reporters identified that the State Department is using the term, “Decapitate and Delegate,” in which the United States eliminates a rival ruler and ensures that the White House’s preferred leader takes over. This was the Donald Trump administration’s model in Venezuela, and it has evidenced this approach in Iran with Trump’s social media post in which he called for the “selection of a GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader(s)” as a condition for ending the war.

Screen capture of U.S. President Trump’s Truth Social post, 6 March 2026

The fourth way that wars may end is a formal surrender.

This is where a defeated party submits itself to the terms of the victor via a formal surrender instrument. These are exceptionally rare in the context of modern warfare, and while Trump’s social media post called for an “unconditional surrender,” the U.S. government has not produced the specific provisions that may constitute a surrender instrument.

Finally, there may be a negotiated peace agreement.

There are myriad types of peace agreements, any of which may be achieved through negotiation of the terms required to cease hostilities. These negotiations may be directly between the parties or done via an intermediary.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. and Iranian governments were engaged in nuclear negotiations, which demonstrated at least a modicum of openness to dialogue. However, the negotiations fell through for several reasons, including problematic approaches and competing priorities.

While the failure of previous negotiations and subsequent outbreak of hostilities does not completely rule out the possibility of resumed dialogue, it certainly introduces potential audience costs. In other words, leaders must now consider the domestic political costs of compromise being perceived as weakness.

Implications

When we break it down this way, a few things become clear:

Iran does not have to fight to win; rather, they just need to fight not to lose. For the Iran side, any outcome that preserves the regime and system of governance that has been in place for the past 47 years is a success. As such, its current approach of launching attacks against targets across twelve countries is meant to impose diplomatic and economic costs in addition to military effects in hopes that it compels the U.S. and Israel side to disengage from their war effort.
“Conquest” and “negotiated peace agreement” can be ruled out as possible outcomes in this war. Conquest is incredibly rare in modern warfare, and neither the White House nor the new Supreme Leader in Iran will want to negotiate anything with the opposing side but a de facto surrender in their favor. Disengagement would likely precede any resumption of negotiations between the White House and the existing Iranian regime.
The U.S. will keep pushing for a surrender (whether formal or de facto). If they cannot achieve that end, the White House will likely shift towards declaring that all of its objectives have been met and will simply disengage.

A U.S. Central Command statement describing Iran’s attacks across the region, published 6 March 2026

There are two wildcards here. The first is Israel, since the Netanyahu administration will continue pushing for what it sees as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for regime change in Iran. It will take active efforts from the United States to restrain Israel.

The second is the White House’s willingness to allow others to do the fighting on its behalf. Trump has already called upon the people of Iran to overthrow the regime, and it appears that the CIA is backing a Kurdish offensive in Western Iran.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (center right) meets with Israel’s Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, and the head of the Mossad to discuss the war, 1 March 2026 (photo via Israel’s Office of the Prime Minister)

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This war is still in its infancy, and all of this assumes that it does not spread into something bigger and more devastating. But it is important to examine the conflict with clear eyes about how the belligerents may want the war to end and what is actually achievable: Iran seeks survival, Israel seeks transformation, and the United States must decide how much risk it is willing to accept in pursuit of its desired outcome.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is a seasoned international negotiator and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. He is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Previously, Michael served as the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. He is a former East-West Center Fellow, a military veteran, and the author of “Negotiate: A Primer for Practitioners.”