Navigating risks and opportunities via the Arctic Council
The Arctic Council convenes in Reykjavík, 11 October 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @CMC_NATO)
The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, opening new sea routes, resource-rich areas, and militarily strategic territory that governments and companies are moving quickly to leverage. Meanwhile, the Arctic Council, the region’s main international forum for cooperation, has not met at political level since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, though its scientific working groups have continued their efforts. The Council’s survival currently rests on a narrow civilian mandate, as well as its ability to manage the mounting pursuit of individual interests in the region.
Until now, the Arctic Council has survived the most serious rupture in its history because it avoided taking on security functions, but there is an important question of whether the council must adapt to new competition to maintain its relevancy and utility. Should it adopt a security dimension that is seemingly inextricable from the other functional areas related to the Arctic, or must it remain strictly focused on non-military issues?
Answering that question requires a fundamental understanding of the Council’s purpose, how Arctic governments’ positions shifted after February 2022, and the two viable approaches that practitioners could take use to sustain collaboration. What this examination reveals is that while the Council’s political level may be frozen, its technical core, its legal agreements, and chairperson rotation remain intact, creating an opportunity for continued utility going forward. The introduction of military issues, however, may frustrate discourse and cooperation on matters that will inevitably impact the state of global affairs. As such, the path of focusing on what actually works to head off disputes rather than what might work in theory is the most practical way to address at least some of the major regional contentions. That continued engagement may then keep the door open for a future circumstance when the political level of the council can reconvene and explore other matters for deliberation.
The evolving Arctic
Climate change is turning the Arctic from a frozen periphery into a contested frontier. Diminishing sea ice is opening new shipping routes, and significant mineral deposits now accessible in the region have attracted the interest of governments and businesses across the world. The U.S. Department of Defense projected that by 2030 many of these resource-rich areas will be nearly ice-free during the late summer months, presenting viable investment opportunities in the not-too-distant future. Meanwhile, cargo on Russia’s Northern Sea Route grew from 4 million tons in 2024 to 31.5 million in 2019, while Russia’s Arctic zone now produces over 75% of its natural.
Non-Arctic states have also recognized these opportunities, the most prominent of which being China. Beijing now describes China as a “near-Arctic state,” and it has doubled its Arctic-related investment over the past decade with a focus on critical mineral extraction and transportation development in line with Russia’s Trans-Arctic Corridor plans.
These interests in the region are not purely economic in nature. The U.S. and Swedish governments have both publicly labeled China’s actions in the Arctic as dual-use, meaning their activities have both civilian and military functions. China is not alone in its military interests, as the share of modern equipment in Russia’s Arctic forces rose from 41% to 59% between 2014 and 2019, and the Kola Peninsula in Northeast Russia remains the base of its submarine fleet. China and Russia both maintain that NATO allies have similar ambitions for militarization of the Arctic.
A vessel transits along the coast of Kamchatka, 2021 (photo via Pexels user @Александр Максин)
Managing regional interests via the Arctic Council
In recognition of the various interests and competition related to the northern region, the Arctic Council was established through the Ottawa Declaration on 19 September 1996. Its eight members are the states with territory above the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Six Indigenous peoples' organisations sit as “Permanent Participants” with full consultation rights, which is unusual for an intergovernmental body. As for non-deciding members, the council has thirty-eight observer organizations, wherein thirteen are non-Arctic states, including China, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
Decisions require consensus of all eight permanent members and is led by whichever nation is serving as the chairperson. The chair rotates every two years and is currently under the authority of the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland.
The Ottawa Declaration defines the Council as a forum to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic states, particularly with regard to issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. Six working groups carry most of the practical functions: monitoring and assessment; flora and fauna; the marine environment; emergency response; contaminants; and sustainable development. The working groups have produced three legally binding international agreements, related to search and rescue (2011), marine oil pollution response (2013), and scientific cooperation (2017).
Importantly, the Ottawa Declaration mandates that the Council should not deal with matters related to military or broader security issues. As a result, the direction to exclude these matters has been a large reason as to why practical-level work has continued despite conflict-related shifts in the geopolitical landscape.
Complementary policy arrangements exist as well, most notably the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. The declaration states that Arctic coastal states have the right to manage the region through national policies and the right to implement them by right of sovereignty. However, as stewards of the region, they bear the responsibility of protecting and upholding the environment and complying with the International Maritime Organization’s standards for safety of navigation to prevent or reduce the risks of ship-based pollution and accidents. By decree of the declaration, the five coastal states are expected to cooperate with each other, through timely exchange of data and analyses, based on mutual trust and transparency.
Political contestation, but work continues
The diplomatic fallout from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 extended to the Arctic Council. On 3 March 2022, seven members suspended their participation in the Council, which Russia was chairing at the time, leaving the fate of future work in question.
However, the parties recognized that there were still Arctic issues requiring engagement and cooperation. In June that same year, the seven members resumed limited work on projects without Russian involvement. Then, when Norway took over the chair in 2023, all eight parties restarted engagement on Arctic issues, and by February 2024, they agreed upon written procedures for the fully attended working groups to resume their work virtually. As of September 2026, the Council has not met at a political level, but other work continues at the subject matter expert and scientific levels.
Meanwhile, government strategy documents show how far the ground has shifted around the Council.
Before February 2022, Arctic states treated the region as a zone of cooperation. Norway pursued “high North, low tension.” Sweden wrote in 2020 that cooperation with Russia in the Council “has functioned well” despite the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Canada’s 2017 defence policy had not framed Russia as an adversary. The 2013 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region pledged to “work through the Arctic Council,” and Russia’s 2020 strategy for developing Russia’s arctic zone and national security in the region until 2035 committed to making the Council work effectively under its 2021-23 chairpersonship.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 earned the country unanimous framing as a threat to other Arctic states and Europe: Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively; Norway, Denmark, and Iceland published updated defense strategies with significant military commitments and defensive capacity building; Canada declared “no business as usual” with Russia; and the United States under President Joe Biden adopted a policy of sanctioning Russia and bolstering Ukraine.
The United States has since changed course in its policy approaches, shifting from cooperation with European partners on Arctic matters absent Russia, towards competition over Greenland and eventual steps towards rapprochement with the Kremlin. The Donald Trump administration’s pursuit of Greenland was rooted in a recognition of the importance of the Arctic region, but it contributed to diplomatic confrontation with NATO members. While the Greenland, Denmark, and the United States have concluded an agreement related to Greenland, the White House has since begun shifting towards sanctions relief and reengagement with the Kremlin, represented most significantly by the October 2026 diesel fuel agreement that caught America’s partners off-guard and left them questioning the future trajectory for U.S.-Russia relations.
Meanwhile, Russia responded to the international community’s post-invasion stances by downgrading its political-level position towards the Arctic Council while not abandoning its understanding of the body’s practical-level utility. The 2023 amendment of its Arctic policy put bilateral relations ahead of region-wide formats, while its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept omitted mention of the Council altogether. President Vladimir Putin remarked in March 2025 that the Council “has degraded.” Nevertheless, Russia continues to recognize the Arctic Council as a “key regional body” while also joining the 2024 consensus that restarted working group efforts.
U.S. President Donald Trump, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen sign a new agreement on access and cooperation in Greenland, 22 September 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @WhiteHouse)
Two paths ahead
The Arctic Council members now face a fork in the road. Practitioners who want to sustain intergovernmental collaboration in the Arctic or maintain a channel for improved relations with Russia in the region have two viable options: leverage the limited capacities in the Council that are working; or seek to evolve the Council into something more than originally envisioned in the Ottawa Declaration.
(1) Pledge to keep Arctic Council activities civilian in nature
Up to this point, the Council’s credibility rested on the neutrality of its scientific activities, but that neutrality is under pressure from both sides. Western defense planning increasingly draws on environmental data. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy lists sensing, modelling, and forecasting to enhance their defensive capabilities. Similarly, Finland and Sweden have committed to making their Arctic competencies available to NATO. Russia’s 2021 security strategy claimed that climate concerns are a pretext to obstruct its Arctic development, and its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept pledges to counter the politicization of environmental and climate work.
Militarization of Arctic cooperation via the Council introduces both political and practical challenges. Politically, it allows for the incorporation of broader diplomatic and defense interests, which, at best, makes negotiation and collaboration more complex, and at worst, introduces outright barriers to progress. Practically, the militarization of data introduces security clearance issues which would isolate certain members, participants, and observers from key Arctic-related discussions and initiatives. Additionally, for the purpose of more productive research and insight into Arctic solutions, it would be to the benefit of Arctic states and observers to have access to Russian civilian experts and data considering the country’s overwhelming land and sea mass in the region.
(2) Use the Council for the militarized disputes likely to come
Alternatively, Council members could accept that the Council’s record of substantive engagement makes it the best venue for the military disputes that appear inevitable. All eight would need to agree on a new military working group, serving as a channel for real-time consultation, deconfliction, and incident resolution. For example, NATO may want to restrain Russian military activity in shared waters, such as the Barents Sea, while Moscow condemns NATO’s build-up near its border. Members could give advance notice of major exercises and live-fire areas, agree to minimum distances from land borders and offshore installations, and extend the Russo-Norwegian Incidents at Sea Agreement to all eight countries.
The primary risks in pursuing this mechanism are political fallout and over-emphasis on military matters. In short, the pursuit of new security-related functions could significantly degrade what is currently working within the Council. To avoid the same diplomatic impasses that emerged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, any military-related working group or consultation mechanism within the framework of the Council would need to be kept at the technical level and constrained to the Arctic region. Further, the members would have to take deliberate steps to continue engagement on non-military matters, even if the gravitational pull is towards security issues.
Denmark accepts the Arctic Council chairpersonship from Norway, May 2025 (photo via Instagram @denmarkinusa)
Conclusion
As competition in the Arctic continues, practitioners must consider how they leverage the mechanisms available in the Arctic Council while remaining mindful of the risks associated with expanding its mandate. The two options considered here offer different means of preserving regional cooperation: maintain the Council’s existing civilian functions through commitments to research, data-sharing, and scientific exchange; or expanding its mandate to incorporate security-related issues.
For the time being, the risks of the latter approach may outweigh its potential benefits. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has stalled political-level engagement between Moscow and the other seven Council members, and introducing military matters into an already fragile institutional framework could further undermine the cooperation that remains. Instead, members may prioritize a renewed commitment to civilian research and exploration, including safeguards and assurances addressing concerns over the potential dual-use applications of shared data and access. Such an arrangement would preserve opportunities for mutually beneficial projects while maintain cooperation on science and research necessary to address shared challenges.
That does not mean that security considerations can be ignored. The Council could retain the possibility of establishing an ad hoc military consultation mechanism to address specific incidents or emerging risks, without immediately formalizing a broader security mandate. Should regional tensions intensify or the political circumstances change, a more structured mechanism for management security competition could be considered in the future.
Whatever the respective Council members may choose, risks and opportunities within the Arctic are shared, regardless of individual intent. The consequences of decisions made in the region affect far more than just coastal countries in the Northern hemisphere, impacting global environmental conditions, international commerce, and wider geopolitical stability. The challenge going forward is navigating uncharted geopolitical waters with an understanding of the utility—and limitations—of the mechanisms that are currently in place.
Max Holiday is a public policy researcher with an international background spanning Europe, Africa, and Asia. He is currently pursuing a double MSc in Public Management and Social Development at Copenhagen Business School and Chinese Academy of Science in Beijing. His research focuses sustainable development, economic policy, and international cooperation in addressing complex global challenges.
