Responding to domestic security crises in El Salvador and Guatemala

Guards provide security during a presidential visit to the CECOT, 1 February 2026 (photo via the Presidential Office of El Salvador)

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Faced with escalating gang violence, El Salvador and Guatemala have both declared states of emergency, but their responses have diverged in priorities and risk tolerance. Under President Nayib Bukele, El Salvador has pursued an aggressive strategy of mass incarceration and expanded state control, delivering much-lauded reductions in violence but raising concerns about long-term institutional erosion. In contrast, Guatemalan leader Bernardo Arévalo has paired emergency powers with a stated commitment to institutional reform and anti-corruption efforts, emphasizing state legitimacy over coercive dominance. This divergence reflects a central policy dilemma across gang-affected states: whether durable security is best achieved through enduring quarantine of the problem, structural reform, or a calibrated combination of both.

Of the two, El Salvador’s approach has garnered more praise from domestic policy audiences and external partners like the United States, but it risks undermining civil liberties and long-term institutional resilience. Guatemala’s strategy, by contrast, seeks slower but potentially more sustainable gains by coupling temporary emergency powers with judicial and anti-corruption reforms. Policymakers in gang-affected countries face a trade-off in these approaches: short-term security versus long-term state legitimacy, and the Northern Triangle’s experience suggests that the most durable solutions may require carefully sequencing coercive measures with structural reforms.

Background

The Northern Triangle of Central America (i.e., Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala) has faced rising violence and extortion on the streets in recent decades. In the 2010s, the average homicide rate in Guatemala was over 40 per 100,000 persons and over 60 in El Salvador and Honduras. This starkly contrasted the world average of 5 per 100,000 during the same time period, making Central America the region with the highest and most volatile homicide rate according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC). The two largest gangs in this region, MS-13 and Barrio 18, have been extorting the nations as they each compete for the top spot using fear-based tactics, including but not limited to kidnappings, murder, and displaying of dead bodies, among other violent acts.

The emergence of these nationwide criminal groups (also known as “illegal armed structures”) can be traced back to the mid-1990s, when a confluence of factors created the conditions for an explosion in gang-related activity. In 1996, the U.S. reform act on illegal immigration and immigrant responsibility was put into action and, as such, allowed for the deportation of gang members to their countries of origin. In essence, street violence was transported from the streets of the United States to the Northern Triangle of Central America. The deportees, many of whom had little-to-no ties to their countries of origin, entered communities that were fresh out of decades-long civil wars. In many cases, the local populaces had endured large-scale destruction of human capital and severe disruptions to political and economic security. In particular, post-civil war Guatemala saw a disproportionate effect on rural communities in labor market earnings, effectively making the poor poorer and exacerbating economic inequalities. Similar trends were observed in its neighboring countries.

Signing of the “Firm and Lasting Peace Agreement” ending the Guatemalan Civil War, 29 December 1996 (photo via UNESCO)

These broken environments provided the perfect breeding ground for criminal groups who could exploit the lack of security. Street gangs started policing their own local communities and extorting locally operated businesses (even multinational corporations, in some cases) through what became known as “la renta.” The local communities could do little to counteract the expansion of gang influence, particularly as the continued deportation from the United States well after the turn of the millennium provided a steady stream of new recruits. These deportations continued to increase and showed no signs of slowing over the years up until the pandemic, where El Salvador received 244,000 deportees over a 17 year period from the late-1990s to late-2010s. Conditions exacerbated when gangs began leveraging the combination of high poverty and low social mobility to position themselves as the prime opportunity for disaffected youth. Once initiated into these gangs, there was no safe exit, leaving recruits with a lifelong commitment to these illegal armed structures.

Central American governments have attempted to counteract the rise in gang-related crime through crackdowns in the past, but isolated policies have fallen short of achieving durable change. Further, with the primary focus being removal of violent elements from the street through increased arrests, it contributed to collateral damage in marginalized communities, namely a rise in the rate of sexual violence against women. When the crackdowns were successful, the arrests merely transported violent actors to often overcrowded prisons, inadvertently creating other recruitment centers and de facto headquarters for the illegal armed structures.

Responding to domestic security crises

The governments in both El Salvador and Guatemala decided to treat acute incidents involving gang violence as domestic security crises between government forces and illegal armed structures within their respective countries. In response, both El Salvador and Guatemala declared states of emergencies, albeit with varied approaches.

For El Salvador, this move came in March 2022 when the legislative assembly approved a state of emergency following a reported 62 homicides in a single day. Under this declaration, police were authorized to arrest citizens without a warrant. Subsequently, there was an immediate spike in arrests, with President Bukele boasting on X (Twitter) that El Salvadoran authorities had arrested 2,163 gang members in under four days. Before long, Bukele had overseen the construction and operation of the Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT) with a capacity of 40,000 prisoners and a current population of around 14,000 (although this figure may now be higher).

In addition to the enforcement of states of exception, both states have used language and classifications in an attempt to designate the highest priority to combatting their respective domestic security crises. The Supreme Court of El Salvador has designated both MS-13 and Barrio 18 as “terrorist organizations,” thereby altering the legal classification in ways that carry political and practical implications. In short, it expands prosecutorial authority and permits use of force and security measures usually reserved for threats to state sovereignty. In El Salvador, this is particularly notable in the opening of CECOT which was designed to incapacitate gang leadership and sever communication nodes within gang-related networks. Bukele has also simultaneously increased security forces on the street, with identity checkpoints and raids occurring in neighborhoods known to have a high volume of gang presence signaling a reassertion of state sovereignty over areas previously controlled by illegal armed structures.

Bukele’s approach has garnered praise and condemnation alike. The transformation of El Salvador from one of the most dangerous places in the world for violent crime into one of the safest has earned praise from leaders and communities worldwide, who  labelled him as a “role model” for his swift action. The construction of the CECOT was something that prison administrators argued is the “key to winning the war against gangs,” and even became the destination for U.S. deportees under the Donald Trump administration. At the same time, Bukele’s approach has also drawn criticism from various civil rights watchdogs, with Amnesty International calling it a “perfect storm of human rights violations.”

The neighboring Guatemala followed a similar pattern of action. When a coordinated violent prison attack spilled over into the streets, President Arévalo announced a state of emergency on 19 January 2026. Like the declaration in El Salvador from four years prior, this state of emergency has allowed for arrests without warrants and the curtailment of some civil liberties. Many Guatemalans believe, however, that unlike El Salvador’s exceptional state (which has been ongoing since 2022), Guatemala’s condition is temporary to secure control over state institutions and to move forward with reform of the justice system.

Gangs in Guatemalan prisons have exploited weaknesses in state control that the government now seeks to remedy. This included the ability to obtain multiple privileges within the walls such as king-sized beds, air-conditioning, and marketable good such as drugs and alcohol. In even more serious cases, imprisoned gang members have bribed prison officers to let them walk freely from the high-security facilities, signaling an overall weak punishment and rehabilitation system in the country.

So far, the Guatemalan government’s efforts have produced mixed results. In the month-long state of emergency that was lifted on 17 February 2026, Arévalo stated that extortion fell by 33% and homicide fell by 49% compared to the same period in 2025. However, local voices have their doubts about the longevity of this peaceful period, with one resident saying that Guatemala is merely enacting “weak measures disguised as big decisions.” It looks unlikely for Guatemala to follow El Salvador’s footsteps into an uncertain and years-long state of emergency, with Guatemalan Interior Minister Marco Antionio Villeda stating that the declaration last month was already a painful decision for any democracy to take.

The key difference in Guatemala’s approach is the behind-the-scenes work. Arévalo, in his speech following the announcement of the state of emergency, asserted that Guatemala is in the midst of “free[ing] its institutions from the criminal networks that traffic in corruption and impunity.” In this way, Arévalo and his government are moving forward with reforms to the justice system in effort to combat the gang violence. Additionally, Arévalo has also set his sights on tackling corruption and promised in his presidential campaign to address poverty and inequality, proving a stark contrast to the singularly authoritarian-focused measures of Bukele.

President Arévalo walks through an area previously affected by gang violence, 18 February 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @BArévaloDeleon)

The way ahead

For El Salvador and Guatemala to be successful in providing long-term solutions to these acute domestic security crises, it is important to address the root sources of conflict, institutionalize peace processes, and create opportunities for non-violent engagement within the communities. As such, a breakdown of the individual issues is useful.

Achieving and preserving a cessation of violence 

The easy and immediate approach available to the governments was the direct intervention to remove violence from the streets. While this approach resulted in an immediate drop in the homicide rate (which is what was observed in the days following the state of emergencies in Guatemala and El Salvador), the unanswered question is how they mitigate longer-term risk of violence.

To preserve peace on the streets following the ending of the state of emergency in Guatemala, stones have been placed in the eastern department of Izabal for a maximum security prison to host more than 2,000 high-risk inmates. Comparisons of this prison have been drawn to that of El Salvador’s CECOT, yet officials deny these similarities in their design and structure. This effort represents  Guatemala’s largest investment in penitentiary infrastructure for 40 years and is dedicated almost exclusively to those convicted of serious gang-affiliated crimes.

Addressing the importation of deported gang members

One key dimension that has played a strong role in the cycles of violence within these states is the importation of deported gang members. As a result of the illegal immigration crackdown under Trump’s administration, individuals and families are being deported to countries like Guatemala and El Salvador with little to no roots. Neither government has instituted specific policies aimed at countering this problem, with El Salvador actually accepting additional deportees from the United States. For both states, addressing this issue moving forward requires not only stronger border and policing coordination but also policies aimed at managing the influx of individuals from overseas.

A prisoner in Guatemala looks out the window of a holding facility, photo published 9 February 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @BArévaloDeleon)

Positive integration of problematic individuals

Reintegration of individuals previously involved in gang activity–whether at home or abroad–is another key step in the long-term path to peace. While current policies have largely prioritized incapacitation through incarceration and emergency security measures, sustainable reductions in violence require pathways that allow former gang members and at-risk youth to decouple from criminal networks and reintegrate into society. 

Equally important is the development of reintegration frameworks for individuals leaving prison; ensuring that they have access to legitimate employment and social support structures rather than returning to the environments that facilitated gang involvement is critical. Through government investment from Guatemala and El Salvador to this plan, gang recruitment bases can be weakened while also strengthening community resilience.

El Salvador has launched a prison factory scheme and authorities have confirmed that, by participating in the prison labor, inmates can receive a reduction in time served. This prison reform implements structure and skills into the system that has been characterized as overcrowded and unstable. However, vagueness still surrounds the organization of this, as it is unclear which individuals or facilities  are eligible to participate. Other reports state that only non-gang affiliated prisoners are entitled, reserved for those who the government calls “trusted inmates.” Expansion of this program to encompass those convicted of low-level gang-related activities could prove critical to El Salvador in providing not just punishment but rehabilitation and reintegration, and it could serve as a model for neighboring Guatemala.

Prisoners operate under a work program that allows for truncated sentences in El Salvador, screen capture from video published 20 January 2026 (via X/Twitter @nayibbukele)

Security vacuum in local populations

As evident in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, the fact that security is not always sourced from the government enables gang exploitation. The formal solution to this is to increase authority presence on the streets, e.g., what has been observed particularly in El Salvador. But the fundamental issues for both countries is how their respective governments will prevent a security vacuum after the returning to relative states of normalcy.

This is where grassroots measures may be useful in bridging local communities with state security forces in positive ways. Early detection and reporting of criminal activity such as la renta or other illegal rackets can help prevent any gang resurgence while fostering communication and trust between local communities and the government architectures responsible for civil administration. While certain religious organizations have sought to bridge gaps with ex-gang members ex-gang members, more comprehensive and institutionalized approaches will be necessary.

Improvement of socioeconomic opportunity

Numerous studies suggest the relationship between social mobility and levels of violence, with lack of intergenerational mobility being identified as one of the strongest and consistent predictors of violent crime and homicide. Thus, providing key opportunities for socioeconomic mobility may alleviate levels of violence as well as recruitment into the gangs. Coupled with El Salvador’s state of emergency, the Gini index (a measurement of income inequality) has decreased, indicating a reduction in the levels of income inequality. In Guatemala, however, social mobility has been constrained by limited access to jobs and education. These factors can lead young people to believe that joining gangs is the only option for them and their future. To combat this, stronger governance and social programs targeting education and training should be pursued, as well as targeting of scholarship programs.

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Ultimately, these factors collectively highlight that while emergency security measures can achieve a short-term cessation of hostilities, preserving and building upon that peace requires a broader and more sustained strategy. Addressing the transnational dynamics of deported gang members, creating viable reintegration pathways for former offenders, rebuilding state legitimacy in communities where security vacuums persist, and expanding socioeconomic opportunities are all essential components of preventing renewed cycles of violence. For both El Salvador and Guatemala, the central challenge is how to transform immediate security gains into structural reforms that address the root issues of gang recruitment and community resilience to strengthen the foundations of long-term peace.

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Teah Smith is a researcher at the Parley Policy Initiative. Her work focused on intrastate conflict and peacebuilding, with particular interests in political violence, social cohesion, and public policy responses in fragile contexts. Currently completing an undergraduate degree in economics and societies at Sciences Po Paris, Teah has developed an interest in international development and economic policy. Outside of her academics, her experiences span across applied experience in diplomacy and civil society, including an internship with the Australian Embassy in Beijing and providing administrative and essential care to asylum seeking communities in the Greater Reims, France area.

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