The six fears associated with North Korean nukes

Kim Jong Un inspects a uranium enrichment facility, September 2024 (photo via KCNA)

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What is the biggest fear associated with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons?

This is a fundamental question, but not one that has garnered a consistent answer among policymakers and analysts despite the innumerable studies, reports, and commentaries on the matter. The absence of a common understanding of the fears associated with North Korean nuclear arms affects the ability to develop consistent policies and implement effective negotiating strategies towards denuclearization goals, whatever they may be. To gain that consistency and effectiveness, it is necessary to differentiate between the fears, because each one drives disparate policy requirements and approaches to negotiation with the Kim Jong Un regime.

In any negotiation, clarity of interests is critical. Successful negotiators base their strategies on what they are trying to achieve and what they are willing to concede to get it. If negotiators are unsure of the interests associated with either of these things, they expose themselves to suboptimal approaches, incorrect application of incentives and coercion, and missed opportunities for getting what they really need from their counterparts. In the case of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear capabilities, it comes down to the problem policymakers are trying to solve; in other words, what exactly are they trying to prevent the DPRK from doing, and, in turn, what do they need to take to stop the DPRK from doing it? Thus, the things these policymakers are trying to prevent are driven by their fears. These fears drive interests, and these interests drive policy objectives.

In the case of North Korean nuclear capabilities, there are six fundamental fears that have underpinned policymaking and approaches to negotiations. To understand them, it is useful to review the recent history of the DPRK’s nuclear program and failed attempts by international actors to achieve progress in denuclearization.

Background

The North Korean nuclear issue has concerned the international community for more than three decades, starting in earnest with the first North Korean nuclear crisis from 1993 to 1994. Troubles began with the revelation that North Korea was progressing in developing an independent nuclear program. It continued with the DPRK government’s announcement that it intended to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This kicked off a security crisis, principally between the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK), and DPRK as to how to manage the fallout from the Kim regime’s decision to walk away from the global non-proliferation regime and inter-Korean agreements on the matter.

After an extended period of tensions, the U.S. government entered into negotiations with the DPRK on denuclearization, eventually concluding the “Agreed Framework” in 1994. This agreement essentially granted food aid and support for peaceful use of nuclear power in the DPRK in exchange for freezing North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. But the Agreed Framework fell apart with DPRK non-committal and U.S. congressional funding issues for the deal, leaving a brief period in which denuclearization was off the table for dialogue.

Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung during a 1994 visit to Pyongyang in which he sought to facilitate negotiations aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis (photo via the Carter Center)

That was until the Six Party Talks began in 2003. The two Koreas had entered a period of rapprochement owing to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s so-called “Sunshine Policy” towards the North, and the DPRK agreed to enter into negotiations with the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia on its nuclear program. The Six Party Talks operated intermittently for the next few years until the DPRK conducted its first nuclear warhead test on 9 October 2006. The Kim regime would conduct another on 25 May 2009.

In 2012, the U.S. government once again attempted to negotiate some parameters related to denuclearization with the 29 February “Leap Day Deal.” That agreement collapsed almost immediately with a DPRK satellite launch event shortly thereafter–something they had stated they would not do given the agreed-upon moratorium on DPRK long range missile launches.

The DPRK would conduct four more nuclear tests. Those took place on 12 February 2013, 6 January 2016, 9 September 2016, and 3 September 2017.

In 2018, the DPRK entered another period of diplomacy with the United States and South Korea, and, again, denuclearization was on the table for discussion. There were three meetings between Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump–in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom–but none produced any substantive progress on the matter. For policymakers, the denuclearization problem persists, even if they do not agree on the fundamental fear underpinning that problem.

The six fears and how to address them

Through all these years of negotiation, there have been many calls for denuclearization, but only six basic fears that have consistently provided the impetus for negotiations. This section covers these fears, as well as the unilateral policies and negotiating objectives that are most appropriate for addressing them, because they all drive different requirements.

Fear #1: The DPRK will use its nuclear weapons.

In other words, this is the concern that the DPRK cannot be deterred the same as other actors. This fear is common among those who believe the Kim regime is irrational; that is, DPRK leadership will not demonstrate the pragmatic restraint necessary for principles such as mutually assured destruction to work. It often leads to advocacy for aggressive deterrent postures that exceed what the United States and its partners have in place elsewhere in the world to counterbalance other nuclear-capable countries.

If one believes that the DPRK is undeterrable or will eventually be desperate enough to use its nuclear weapons, the goal must be swift and complete denuclearization. The overarching principle is that the DPRK cannot be trusted to possess weapons of such devastating capability in any quantity at any time. As such, a four-pronged approach becomes necessary: (1) block the DPRK advancement of its nuclear capabilities; (2) deter the DPRK as much as possible; (3) maintain the military capabilities necessary to eliminate the DPRK's nuclear arsenal swiftly and effectively; and (4) build the capability to shoot down any missiles that could be carrying nuclear warheads. The only logical negotiating objective in dealing with a nuclear-armed counterpart that is not deterrable is complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization—essentially, the status quo approach by the United States and its partners.

Kim Jong Un engages with Korean People’s Army leaders during the “Fire and Fury” escalation cycle with the United States, August 2017 (photo via KCNA)

Fear #2: A nuclear-capable DPRK will act with greater impunity.

Some believe that even if the risk of the DPRK actually using its nuclear weapons remains low, the possession of nuclear capabilities will embolden the Kim regime in its illicit behaviors abroad and its escalatory activities in the region.

Since the concept here is that possession of nuclear weapons allows the DPRK to escalate nefarious actions, the country cannot be trusted to possess the weapons in any quantity at any time; however, it does not require the same level of urgency as the first fear detailed above. Thus, the goal for any government would be to rally support from the international community in elevating the costs associated with acquisition of nuclear capabilities through sanctions and isolation. A gradual, process-driven approach that attempts to reinforce international rules and norms is acceptable here. Within that approach, seeking DPRK accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and renewing DPRK commitment to denuclearization via lawful means is appropriate. It also includes the use of international inspectors and verifiers and the imposition of sanctions until major milestones are met.

The aftermath of the DPRK’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong-do, November 2010 (photo via Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense)

Fear #3: The DPRK’s flouting of international rules and norms will incentivize other actors to follow in its footsteps.

In other words, this is the fear that acceptance of the DPRK’s nuclear-armed status will cause the global nonproliferation regime to collapse. Essentially, the belief is that formal recognition and treatment of the DPRK as a nuclear state will inspire others to proliferate, too. Those that fear this not only worry about irresponsible state actors acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g., Iran), but countries like the ROK and Japan who, in response to the DPRK’s arsenal, may pursue commensurate capabilities in a new arms race.

Here, a dual track approach is necessary: first, one must deter other would-be nuclear powers from pursuing the same path as the DPRK; and second, one must reassure allies and partners who might otherwise vie to become nuclear powers themselves. To achieve these policy objectives, a government would have to rally support from the international community in elevating the costs associated with acquisition of nuclear capabilities. They would also need to offer reassurances to allies who are worried about their own lack of nuclear weapons. This may include amplifying extended deterrence messages or even stationing nuclear-capable forces on their soil, if so desired. In negotiations with the DPRK, the goal would be to achieve some measure of arms control that leads to reduction and/or elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal. Also, the negotiations should seek to push the DPRK towards international rules and norms, including accession to the nonproliferation treaty and use of international inspectors and verifiers.

Fear #4: The DPRK will proliferate nuclear weapons and associated technology to other state and non-state actors.

To put this fear plainly: this is the concern that the DPRK will sell its nuclear weapons and technology to “bad guys” in other parts of the world.

With this fear, the overarching principle is that the DPRK will not be responsible keepers of nuclear weapons and technology, so steps are needed to ensure they do not proliferate to other actors. Policymakers have three basic responsibilities: incentivize good faith behavior; track and control DPRK nuclear arsenals; and punish illicit activities. Naturally, the role of the international community is critical here. A broad network of countries is needed to keep track of DPRK proliferation, to engage in monitoring missions abroad, and, if necessary, to conduct interdiction operations. The international community must also impose punitive measures for any actor seeking to benefit from the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs. Any negotiation with the DPRK should push towards process-based adherence to international rules and norms. Specific to the nuclear issue, the goals would be DPRK accession to the nonproliferation treaty; a DPRK commitment to denuclearization via lawful means; and the agreement to allow inspection and verification, whether by a third party or bilaterally such as the arrangement under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). A mix of incentives and coercion (likely via sanctions relief and enforcement) would be necessary to ensure major milestones are met.

A DPRK-produced rocket propelled grenade discovered in Hamas possession in Gaza, 2023 (photo via ROK National Intelligence Service)

Fear #5: DPRK nuclear blackmail will increase the risk of abandonment.

This fear is often tied to the U.S.-ROK alliance and the question of whether Americans would be willing to trade “Los Angeles for Seoul.” The reality is that if the DPRK has nuclear weapons capable of reaching Canberra, Tokyo, or other major metropolitan areas, it could feasibly deter any country’s involvement in a security conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Here is an operative example: imagine the DPRK said, "Japan, if you allow allied forces to operate from or transit through your territory, we will target Tokyo with nuclear weapons. However, if you stay out of it, we will show restraint." How would the Japanese government respond? One cannot know for sure, but the existence of this option for the DPRK increases the risk and fear of allied abandonment.

With this fear, an operative assumption is that the DPRK would only pursue nuclear blackmail in dire circumstances where the regime itself is under threat. Thus, to address this fear, one must mitigate scenarios where the DPRK would blackmail an ally; that is, deter DPRK aggression and restrain others who might seek to execute hostile acts against the Kim regime. As for potential targets for blackmail, such threats are only effective when victims feel they have more to lose in a situation, so one must take steps toward ensuring the ally will not abandon obligations if that blackmail does eventually come.

A three-pronged approach is necessary here with measures aimed at reducing the DPRK nuclear arsenal, normalizing relations to eliminate the perception that the regime is under threat, and reaffirming allied support (e.g., reassurance of commitment to alliance obligations and drafting/finalization of operational plans). It is also prudent to establish contingency plans for situations where an ally does not meet its obligations. Meanwhile, negotiations with the DPRK should seek to push towards process-based adherence to international rules and norms. This could include arms control measures and reduction of nuclear capabilities which would help minimize the risk of these weapons being used for blackmail. Once again, a mix of incentives and coercion via sanctions relief and enforcement would be necessary to ensure major milestones are met.

Fear #6: The Kim regime will lose control of its nuclear weapons. 

This is a scenario envisioned in many the novel and movie (for example, Doctor Strangelove, Crimson Tide, and Steel Rain II: The Summit): an irrational actor within a government or military seizes a nuclear weapon and demonstrates an intent to use it. In this scenario, it does not matter how rational Kim Jong Un may be if a hardliner, revolutionary, or separatist were to get a hold of a nuclear weapon and decide to employ it against the ROK, Japan, United States, or anyone else.

With this fear, the deterrable actor in power is safer than a rogue operator. What this means is that those who fear the DPRK government losing control of its nuclear weapons should seek to stabilize the Kim regime, because the more stable the regime, the less likely that outcome. Simultaneously, one should build contingency plans for how to find and secure the DPRK's nuclear weapons should the regime collapse or a breakdown of command and control occurs. Unilateral policies should focus on engagement with the Kim regime and provision of enough aid to supplement the regime's internal efforts. This does not mean rewarding bad behavior; rather, it is acceptable to sanction the DPRK so long as the sanctions are aimed at punishing the regime, not deposing it.

Understanding that the Kim regime may be better than the alternative, it is important to use negotiations to shape the DPRK government towards adoption of international rules and norms—particularly nuclear safeguards. The agreements should be well-crafted and focused on process-based implementation. The point is to put actionable steps in place to normalize the DPRK government. Negotiations would have to treat the Kim regime as an equal partner to legitimize the negotiations, any agreements they produce, and the government that is producing it.

General Jack Ripper from “Dr. Strangelove” (top), Russian separatist Vladimir Radchenko from “Crimson Tide” (bottom left), and coup leader General Kwak Chul Woo from “Steel Rain II” (bottom right) were all fictional characters who seized control of nuclear arms for their own designs

Charting a course forward

Conditions moving forward are complex. The DPRK government has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of denuclearizing, going so far as to inform the United States that a precondition to renewed engagement is dropping denuclearization as a negotiating objective. However, in negotiations, there is “no ‘always’ and no ‘never’,” meaning that one should not accept that another party will always do something or never do it. Rather, the question is what would it take to get the other party to accept something they are not necessarily inclined to do.

Right now, there is an internal debate within various governments as to whether it is prudent simply to drop the denuclearization topic altogether. The South Korean government under President Lee Jae Myung has already re-labeled and downgraded denuclearization as a negotiating objective. Meanwhile, some players within the U.S. government are amenable to dropping denuclearization even if others in the interagency are not.

From a negotiation perspective, the debate will continue to be ineffective until the parties responsible for managing North Korea policy reach a consensus on what it is they truly fear about the DPRK possession of nuclear arms. If there are no real fears, then dropping denuclearization as a policy and negotiating objective is easy. But if there are still fears (which there likely will be), policymakers must ask themselves: which fears are driving their interests vis-à-vis North Korea’s nuclear weapons program?

Whatever it may be, the answer to that question is what should inform policymaking because of the disparate requirements that come in response to each fear. Until policymakers come to terms with this fundamental question, engagement with the DPRK on nuclear issues will continue to play out as they have for the past thirty years–ebbs and flows in dialogue as North Korea steadily moves forward with its own nuclear policy designs.

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Michael MacArthur Bosack is a seasoned international negotiator and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. He is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Michael is a former East-West Center Fellow, a military veteran, and the author of “Negotiate: A Primer for Practitioners.”

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