The central debate for inter-Korean policy

Residents of Seoul go about their every day lives (photo by Chris Hobgood)

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Faced with North Korea’s unwavering insistence on its right to possess nuclear weapons, its refusal to engage in dialogue, and its rejection of unification initiatives, the administration of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is hedging on its approach for accomplishing peaceful coexistence. While President Lee’s inter-Korean engagement strategy—outlined in his vision for “Establishing a Foundation for Sustainable Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula”—draws on the cooperative spirit of previous progressive administrations, it marks a fundamental and pragmatic shift as the Lee government explores alternative frameworks that avoid clashing with Kim Jong Un’s two-state position. These approaches diverge from the long-standing principle of reunification that has underpinned South Korea’s inter-Korean policy for decades and remains enshrined in its state constitution today. With both Koreas—though for very different reasons—now possibly aligned on the prospect of solidifying their recognition as separate states, the Lee government’s paradigm shift opens a policy window that may enable the two Koreas to advance toward a permanent peace treaty and move one step closer to resolving the Korea question once and for all.

The first challenge for the South Korean government will be reconciling its own internal debate on the unification issue. There are the standard gaps that have already received much attention in polling; namely, older generations versus younger generations and conservatives versus progressives. However, within the ruling Minjoo Party, there is also a widening divide between those who view the recognition of two sovereign states as a necessary step towards peaceful coexistence and those who cannot reconcile abandonment of their long-standing vision for reunification. This debate will continue to play out in the coming years as the Lee Jae Myung administration seeks to rekindle dormant inter-Korean engagement, and it is an important one for relevant stakeholders and observers to understand.

Public sentiments

As South Korean political leaders seek to update their inter-Korean policies to adjust to North Korea’s two-state position, they will remain cognizant of public sentiments. Both independent think tanks and South Korean government-sponsored research centers have conducted regular polls on these issues through the years, all revealing that public sentiments have trended towards recognition of two sovereign states on the Korean Peninsula.

Polling from the East Asia Institute found that public support of a two-state system significantly increased from 33% to 44.9% between 2015-2020, ranking first as their preferred method of unification. Another study from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) indicates a steady rise in the public’s belief that unification is no longer necessary, suggesting a growing acceptance among South Koreans of a permanent separation. Meanwhile, government polling of primary and secondary school students also shows a steadily increasing number of South Korean youths who feel that unification is unnecessary.  

Meanwhile, the diminished importance of ethnic kinship, especially among younger generations, has contributed to the growing acceptance of a permanent separation. Identity polling from 2025 reveals an increase in respondents who view North Korea as a separate country, with almost 30% identifying them as distinct countries and 60% as somewhat distinct. Similarly, close to 60% of respondents perceive North Koreans as either a neighbor, stranger, or enemy, suggesting a growing disconnect in the underlying cultural and ethnic heritage that previously fueled the desire for unification. 

This aggregate polling data suggests that the public may support the current moment as an opportune time to explore alternative frameworks for inter-Korean engagement. While all the options the Lee administration is deliberating involve some form of a two- state policy, key differences center on the extent to solidify the separation and the manner in which they can reconcile longstanding unification goals. 

Background on unification initiatives

Up until North Korea’s 2023 policy announcement rejecting unification, both North and South Korea have agreed, at least in theory, on the goal of having one Korean nation on the Peninsula. The division at the 38th parallel was initially planned in 1948 as a temporary divide after the end of WWII , a mechanism proposed by the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from taking over the entire Korean Peninsula. However, as Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated and they transitioned from lukewarm allies to frigid enemies, the provisional government originally planned for the peninsula was never established. Instead, each side formed its own government: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, aligned with the United States; and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north, aligned with the Soviet Union. Nearly two years later, in 1950, the North invaded the South in an attempt to take control of the southern half of the peninsula. Active conflict ended in July 1953 following the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The armistice created a tenuous peace that has ensued for the last seven decades, with long periods of political disengagement and little progress made towards unification of the two Koreas.

For the first 20 years after the Korean War, there was little attempt to normalize relations between the ROK and DPRK as civil tensions remained high during postwar recovery efforts. In fact, the ROK declined to be a signatory to the original Armistice Agreement, instead codifying its adherence to the terms via separate bilateral arrangements with the United States. It was not until the July 4th Joint Communique in 1972 that the ROK and DPRK issued their first official attempt to establish a working framework leading towards peaceful unification. After the collapse of this initial effort, it was nearly another 20 years before the two sides made any further progress at the political level. 

Following their separate accessions as formal member states of the United Nations in 1991, the two Koreas signed the Inter-Korean Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges, which formally acknowledged their mutual agreement to function under different governance systems until unification. Importantly, the so-called “Basic Agreement” specified that there was no instrument in place to define a relationship between “states.” This meant that while North and South Korea interacted politically, diplomatically, and socially on an interstate level with the international community, interactions between them were deliberately “inter-Korean” in nature, as the framework specified Korea as one nation, temporarily divided.  

DPRK and ROK representatives sign the 1991 Basic Agreement (photo via the Ministry of Unification)

This inter-Korean framework remained in place through three subsequent rounds of notable diplomatic engagement between the ROK and the DPRK. The timeline that follows illustrates the significant gaps in time between milestones in inter-Korean relations:

North Korea’s current position

The North and South’s shared goal for unification remained an underlying premise of inter-Korean relations, with both affirming their commitment to peaceful coexistence as part of the unification process. This principle was reflected in all of the DPRK reunification proposals (“The Three Principles for National Reunification,” the “Koryo Confederation,” and “The Ten-Point Program of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation”) introduced by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and later affirmed by his son, Kim Jong Il. However, progress has been hindered not only by the DPRK's illicit activities, but also by the fundamental differences in unification visions between North and South.

Whatever hope remained that the Kim regime would return to the unification path all but disappeared in December 2023 with Kim Jong Un’s policy announcement during the end-of-year plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea. His regime’s decision not only to abandon the goal of unification but systematically erase all traces of its possibility through a revision of national identity and comprehensive domestic reforms constituted a major geopolitical shock. The DPRK government’s official declaration of South Korea as a hostile nation and subsequent commitment to a permanent separation as sovereign states marked a significant paradigm shift and knocked South Korea off its long-held policy footing. 

Kim Jong Un (front and center) convenes the December 2023 Party Plenary meeting in which he announced his regime’s rejection of unification policies (photo via KCNA)

South Korea’s position in flux

Initially, under the Yoon administration, Seoul’s response to the DPRK’s revised policy towards the ROK was to revert to a mix of 1960s- and 70s-era inter-Korean policy approaches. The Yoon government reaffirmed its commitment to unification and subsequently released a new unification doctrine on 15 August 2024, charting a path to unification through the advancement of human rights and freedoms. Essentially, the Yoon government’s view was that by using information penetration, the DPRK would eventually either collapse inward or liberalize to a point where absorption within the ROK became inevitable.

President Lee has chosen a different path, rejecting the unification by absorption doctrine and returning to an engagement-focused approach. However, the ruling Minjoo Party (also referred to as the “Democratic Party of Korea” or “DPK”), is divided on how to work in tandem with Kim Jong Un’s two-state policies as they seek to improve relations. Some progressives favor cooperating within the framework of the DPRK’s two-state proposition, while others reject it as unconstitutional and antithetical to their mandate as Korean politicians. 

There are four fundamental options for the Lee administration at this point:

(1) Modification of existing “one nation, two sovereign states” policy ideas

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young advocates cooperating with the two-state framework as a mechanism to reduce hostilities and foster engagement, without ruling out the eventuality of reunification. However, Chung’s position differs from Kim Jong Un’s, whose rhetoric perpetuates the narrative of North and South Korea as hostile enemies. He envisions a “peaceful two-state relationship,” with engagement as a key factor in transforming relations from hostile to peaceful. Engagement is not the end objective, but a pragmatic piece of Chung’s overall strategy to address defense and economic concerns. 

(2) Formal acknowledgment of de facto two sovereign states

The progressives favoring a split argue that unification is not a realistic political goal, given the present-day constrained strategic environment. They point out that state-to-state recognition between the two Koreas would simply reflect current international diplomatic practices, as both are independently recognized member states of the United Nations, and since 158 countries have separate diplomatic ties with North and South Korea. However, formal recognition of separate sovereign statehoods between North and South Korea would have legal consequences because it eliminates the existing temporary special status under the existing Basic Agreement.

(3) Constitutional amendment to institutionalize recognition of two sovereign states

While this is technically the option that would be most desired by the North Korean side, it is the least politically viable one given the strong dissent from the conservative population within South Korea as well as opposition from within the Minjoo party. To pursue this measure would require expending a massive amount of political capital with no guarantee of success in cultivating political-level engagement.

(4) Status quo

Some members of the Minjoo Party, such as National Security Advisor Wi Sung Lac, as well as members of South Korea’s conservative groups, oppose the endorsement of a two-state framework, albeit for myriad reasons. First, there is the concern of its unconstitutionality, as a mutual recognition of sovereignty beyond the current special interim status could require a constitutional amendment. Article 3 states, “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands while Article 4 mandates it “shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” Second, breaking from the traditional narrative of a unitary Korean nation sparks concerns that it could be interpreted as a condonation of human rights abuses in North Korea, and as abandoning the principle of Korean ethnic homogeneity, long central to South Korea’s national identity. 

Chung Dong-young (left) and Ahn Gyu-back (right) represent two different policy camps within Lee Jae Myung’s cabinet (photo via X/Twitter @Jaemyung_Lee)

So far, President Lee has pursued a measured approach. He has identified the ratification of a revised Basic Agreement in South Korea’s National Assembly as a key component of his administration’s inter-Korean strategy, signaling a desire to formalize relations between North and South Korea. This action would reinforce his Liberation Day vows to respect the North’s current system, not pursue any form of unification by absorption, nor engage in hostile acts while also giving the dissenting camps within the Progressive party time to find common ground and negotiate a united position. Its ratification also confirms Seoul's commitment to continue to function separately, yet allows the necessary space to reorient its policy approach away from unification without completely abandoning it.

It is unclear whether a revised basic agreement would transition to state-to-state relations or remain on an inter-Korean level. Interstate relations could expedite friendlier future diplomatic relations, including the establishment of embassies, a resumption of cultural and economic cooperation, and a potential permanent peace treaty, while remaining inter-Korean relations could result in a higher level of domestic support politically. While anything less than Seoul's endorsement of a permanent two-state solution might not be enough to entice DPRK to rekindle dialogue and engagement in the near future, ratification of a revised Basic Agreement would lay the framework domestically to begin the long process of building a sustainable, peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.  

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Jessica Earl is an international relations specialist focused on contributing to sustainable peace across deep divides. Her current research and analysis draw on her background in social welfare and disability advocacy, as well as her interest in understanding the conditions that prevent conflict and promote peace and security.

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