Salvadoran intervention in Haiti

Rescue mission or border externalization strategy to tackle gangs?

Salvadoran forces pass by local motorists en route to securing the Sylvio Cator Stadium that had been under gang control since 2024 (photo via X/Twitter @nayibbukele)
On 18 October 2026, Haitian armed gangs ambushed an armored vehicle carrying four Salvadoran aviation technicians serving with the United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in Croix-des-Bouquets, near Port-au-Prince. The four technicians subsequently went missing, prompting President Nayib Bukele to announce a military operation to rescue them. Within four days, El Salvador deployed an initial contingent of approximately 200 special forces personnel to support search-and-rescue operations. This deployment expanded, with around 2,000 Salvadoran troops reported in Haiti by 29 October.
Although initially presented as a humanitarian rescue operation, the intervention has since developed into a broader military engagement against Haitian gangs. Some Haitian residents, exhausted by years of worsening gang violence, forced displacement, and political turmoil following the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, have voiced strong public approval and relief over El Salvador’s tough intervention, but questions remain about its objectives, legitimacy, and implications for Haitian sovereignty.
The intervention should be understood within the context of President Bukele’s domestic security strategy and his ambition to establish El Salvador as a regional model for public security. Since taking office in 2019, Bukele has built considerable political legitimacy around a hardline approach to gang violence, particularly through the expansion of military and police powers, mass arrests, and the implementation of a state of exception in March 2022. This strategy has contributed to a significant decline in reported homicides and strengthened public perceptions of security.
However, its effectiveness has come at considerable human rights costs. Human Rights Watch documents widespread arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and violations of due process under the state of emergency.

Guards provide security during a presidential visit to the El Salvador’s Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo maximum security prison complex, 1 February 2026 (photo via the Presidential Office of El Salvador)
Understanding security externalization beyond borders
The Salvadoran intervention in Haiti offers an opportunity to examine border externalization through the lens of security and counter-gang operations. Traditionally, border externalization refers to the practice through which states extend migration controls and border enforcement beyond their territorial boundaries, often by transferring responsibilities to third countries. Border externalization allows states to exercise control beyond their geographical borders through extraterritorial enforcement practices.
Although this concept has primarily been applied to migration management, it can also provide a useful analytical framework for understanding the international projection of domestic security strategies. Therefore, this interpretation does not suggest that El Salvador is directly implementing conventional migration-border controls in Haiti. Instead, it highlights how the logic of externalization can extend beyond migration to confront criminal organizations through operations conducted outside El Salvador. Such an approach also reflects the growing tendency to frame organized crime as a regional security challenge requiring coordinated international responses.
In the Haitian context, externalization can be understood as extending a state’s security agenda beyond its national territory in response to perceived transnational threats. Rather than simply protecting its own borders, El Salvador is projecting military capabilities, operational practices, and political influence into another country to confront criminal organizations. This represents a broader form of security externalization in which gang violence is framed as a transnational threat requiring intervention beyond the boundaries of the state in which it originates. The intervention therefore raises an important question: to what extent are states increasingly externalizing their domestic security priorities through international military cooperation?

Salvadoran forces mobilize for their deployment to Haiti (screen captures from X/Twitter @nayibbukele)
Sovereignty, multilateralism, and military accountability
The intervention also raises questions about the relationship between externalization and sovereignty. The United Nations Security Council authorized the Gang Suppression Force through Resolution 2793 (2025), allowing participating countries to conduct targeted counter-gang operations in cooperation with the Haitian National Police and Armed Forces. The resolution emphasizes that operations must respect Haiti’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as international human rights law.
Nevertheless, the subsequent deployment of a substantial Salvadoran contingent challenges policymakers and observers to rethink how national military operations fit within this multilateral framework. There is reported uncertainty surrounding the Salvadoran troops’ command arrangements and rules of engagement, even prompting a formal demarche from the U.S. government to ensure proper deconfliction between Salvadoran forces and other on-the-ground personnel. These concerns become particularly significant when foreign forces operate in an already complex security environment involving Haitian police, international personnel, and private security actors.
The ambitions and limits of exporting Bukele’s model
The leadership dimension is equally important. Bukele appears to see himself as a leader capable of confronting criminal organizations through decisive, forceful action, even when conventional international mechanisms have struggled to produce results. His public threats against Haitian gang leaders and the expansion of Salvadoran military involvement reinforce his image as a leader willing to export his security approach beyond national borders. The intervention consequently serves both a security function and a political purpose: it demonstrates El Salvador’s willingness to assume a more prominent role in regional security affairs while reinforcing Bukele’s international reputation as a leader associated with an uncompromising approach to criminal violence.
Nevertheless, the political appeal of exporting Bukele’s security model should not be confused with its practical effectiveness in Haiti. The two countries have substantially different historical, institutional, and political circumstances. In El Salvador, the government’s security strategy operates within an established national police and military structure, although concerns about institutional accountability and executive power remain significant. Haiti, by contrast, faces a profound institutional crisis characterized by weak state authority, political fragmentation, limited judicial capacity, and extensive territorial control exercised by armed groups.
Understanding the relationship between institutional weaknesses and the expansion of gang influence in Haiti is fundamental. Armed groups have benefited from corruption, political connections, illicit financial networks, and the absence of effective state institutions in strategically important areas.
The International Monetary Fund claims that gangs should not be understood exclusively as criminal organizations operating independently of the political system. Their influence is also sustained by relationships with economic and political actors who have historically used armed groups to protect interests, exercise territorial influence, and maintain political power. This complexity makes directly replicating El Salvador’s security model particularly problematic.

Members of the multinational Gang Suppression Force conduct an operation against armed gang positions in Fort Dimanche, November 2026 (photo via X/Twitter @GSForceHaiti)
Human security and the risks of militarized intervention
The humanitarian consequences of militarized responses require careful consideration. Haiti's population is already experiencing widespread displacement, insecurity, sexual violence, and restricted access to essential services. According to the United Nations, gang violence and insecurity have contributed to the displacement of approximately 1.5 million people. The UN Human Rights Office has also documented substantial civilian casualties resulting from gang violence, security-force operations, and attacks by self-defense groups.
While stronger security operations may be necessary to protect communities and restore access to essential infrastructure, poorly coordinated military interventions risk exposing civilians to additional violence. Increased military capacity does not automatically translate into greater human security, particularly when operations lack effective oversight, intelligence, and accountability.
In this context is where the concept of externalization becomes particularly relevant to peacebuilding. Externalizing security responsibilities can provide immediate operational assistance to states experiencing institutional collapse. However, it can also create a situation in which external military actors become increasingly responsible for maintaining security without strengthening the institutions required to sustain it.
In Haiti, this could reinforce dependency on international military interventions while weakening incentives to develop nationally accountable security institutions. It may also create competing security structures in which foreign actors exercise considerable influence over operational priorities, potentially undermining local ownership and public trust.

(Left) Amnesty International reports on the need for Salvadoran forces to comply with international humanitarian law in Haiti; (right) Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s response (screen captures via X/Twitter)
Human security and the risks of militarized intervention
The humanitarian consequences of militarized responses require careful consideration. Haiti's population is already experiencing widespread displacement, insecurity, sexual violence, and restricted access to essential services. According to the United Nations, gang violence and insecurity have contributed to the displacement of approximately 1.5 million people. The UN Human Rights Office has also documented substantial civilian casualties resulting from gang violence, security-force operations, and attacks by self-defense groups.
While stronger security operations may be necessary to protect communities and restore access to essential infrastructure, poorly coordinated military interventions risk exposing civilians to additional violence. Increased military capacity does not automatically translate into greater human security, particularly when operations lack effective oversight, intelligence, and accountability.
In this context is where the concept of externalization becomes particularly relevant to peacebuilding. Externalizing security responsibilities can provide immediate operational assistance to states experiencing institutional collapse. However, it can also create a situation in which external military actors become increasingly responsible for maintaining security without strengthening the institutions required to sustain it.
In Haiti, this could reinforce dependency on international military interventions while weakening incentives to develop nationally accountable security institutions. It may also create competing security structures in which foreign actors exercise considerable influence over operational priorities, potentially undermining local ownership and public trust.
Toward sustainable Haitian security
A sustainable approach therefore requires moving beyond the assumption that dismantling gangs through military force is sufficient to establish lasting security. International intervention should prioritize strengthening the Haitian National Police, improving judicial independence, addressing corruption, and dismantling the financial and logistical networks that sustain armed groups.
Equally important is investment in community-based peacebuilding, employment opportunities, education, and rehabilitation programs for individuals seeking to disengage from armed organizations. The protection and reintegration of children associated with gangs should also form part of a broader strategy addressing the social and economic conditions that facilitate recruitment.
The Gang Suppression Force itself provides a framework through which these objectives could be pursued. Its mandate includes cooperation with Haitian institutions, protecting vulnerable populations, and supporting the development of sustainable security arrangements.
Therefore, rather than allowing the Salvadoran intervention to develop into an independent military campaign, its activities should be integrated into a transparent, coordinated, and Haitian-led security framework. Clear rules of engagement, public reporting, civilian protection mechanisms, and independent investigations into alleged abuses are essential to ensuring accountability.
Security beyond military intervention
The Salvadoran intervention in Haiti invites a broader examination of the changing nature of regional security cooperation, the exportability of Bukele's security model, and the externalization of security responsibilities. The urgency of Haiti's humanitarian and security crisis cannot be dismissed, and international assistance remains necessary to protect civilians and restore state authority. However, deploying additional military forces should not be mistaken for a comprehensive solution to the country's underlying problems.
The central question is therefore not simply whether external military intervention is necessary, but what kind of intervention can produce sustainable security without further undermining state legitimacy and sovereignty. Can the externalization of security and the projection of a hardline security model create lasting stability, or does it risk reproducing the institutional weaknesses and dependencies that make fragile states reliant on external intervention?
Ultimately, the success of international engagement in Haiti is measured in part by the territory recovered from gangs and the number of armed actors neutralized, but also by whether Haitian institutions can provide security, justice, and protection to their population. For that success to be realized, a peacebuilding approach must place Haitian ownership, human rights, institutional accountability, and long-term social recovery at the center of any security strategy.
Claudia Donoso, Ph.D., is the Special Advisor for Human Security and South America at the Parley Policy Institute, as well as an Associate Professor of Graduate International Relations at St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas. Previously, she worked as a Security Advisor for the Ecuadorian Government, including as Security and Defense Advisor in the Ministry of Internal and External Security and as Human Security Consultant at the National Migrants Secretariat, the Ecuadorian Agency for International Cooperation and the National Secretariat of Intelligence. As Under Secretary of Sovereignty and Border Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she coordinated the visit of the General Secretary and the Verification Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS).



