Russia clings to maximalist ceasefire demands

Michael MacArthur Bosack
19 minutes ago
5 min read

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan opens the second round of ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, 2 June 2025 (photo via X @HakanFidan)

Round two of restarted Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations is in the books. The two sides met once again in Istanbul with disparate objectives and low expectations for outcomes. While they were once again able to come to agreements on prisoner exchanges, they remained far apart on the broader negotiating agenda.

Chief among the reasons why the two sides have not gained more traction after more than two weeks into their restarted negotiations is that Russia is clinging to maximalist demands, essentially the same as its negotiators put forward during the original series of ceasefire negotiations that took place more than three years ago. With the Kremlin repeatedly signaling over the past few weeks that these demands will not change, this calls into question whether the two sides will be able to achieve any meaningful progress without a substantial shift in their approaches.

Expectations were low heading into the second round of negotiations. Although the two sides made good on their promise to exchange 1000-for-1000 prisoners following the first negotiating session on May 16, the same reciprocity did not apply to the exchange of memoranda outlining each side’s proposals on the agenda and parameters for the negotiations. The Ukrainian delegation produced theirs ahead of the second round of talks to support preparations for substantive deliberations, but the Russian team decided to withhold its document until they could present it in Istanbul.

Meanwhile, both sides continued their respective war efforts. Russian forces stepped up drone attacks against civilian population centers and began shifting ground forces operations towards the Sumy region of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces responded with their own drone strikes, including the astonishingly successful “Operation Spider Web”--a coordinated attack against Russia’s strategic aircraft fleet.

Going into the talks, Ukraine’s aims were clear. President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted four core objectives: a full and unconditional ceasefire; the “all-for-all” release of prisoners; the return of abducted children; and preparation for a meeting between Zelensky and Vladimir Putin.

Meanwhile, the Russian delegation kept its desired outcomes close hold. The only goal they publicly communicated was the intent to explain their memorandum to the Ukraine side, ostensibly with the purpose of securing an agreement on at least a few items contained in the document.

After a couple of hours of negotiation on 2 June, the two sides produced modest results. They agreed to the following: an “all-for-all” exchange of seriously wounded and ill; an “all-for-all” exchange of soldiers aged 18-25; and repatriation of fallen soldiers’ remains under a 6000-for-6000 formula. On the matter of abducted children, the Ukraine side delivered a list of youths identified as having been taken to Russia. After the talks, Russian lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky criticized Kyiv for turning the issue of forcibly deported children into a “show for compassionate Europeans.” However, he left space for possible repatriations by stating that Russia will return any children whose legal guardians have been positively identified.

The principal reason why the two sides were unable to achieve more progress in the talks was Russia’s negotiating memorandum. The document which was meant to provide a practical set of agenda items and proposals for the ceasefire talks ended up being something entirely different. Later published via Russian state media, the memorandum called for the following:

Demobilization of Ukrainian forces and withdrawal from the “borders of the Russian Federation”
Termination of foreign military aid
Prohibition of foreign military presence and operations on Ukrainian soil
Prohibition of sabotage or subterfuge against Russia and its citizens
Restrictions on the number and type of weapon systems Ukrainian forces may possess
Establishment of a bilateral monitoring commission
Release of detainees
Lifting of martial law in Ukraine
Mandating a presidential election for Ukraine within 100 days of the lifting of martial law
International recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
Non-NATO and non-nuclear status for Ukraine
Lifting of sanctions against Russia
Withdrawal of international legal action against Russia
Legal changes in Ukraine to prohibit Nazism and to protect the Russian language and culture
Conclusion of a permanent peace treaty that is ratified by the respective legislatures

This is a rehashing of the same maximalist demands that Russia put forward during the ceasefire negotiations from March to April 2022. The only provision dropped from the March 2022 Istanbul Communique and April 2022 draft agreement related to alleged Ukrainian chemical and biological weapons development. In several cases, Russian demands have expanded. For example, the 2022 documents only deal with territorial issues related to Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea, while the 2025 memorandum adds Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Further, the 2022 proposal stated that the two sides would remain open to resolving the political issues related to Crimea within ten to fifteen years, which is no longer on the table.

While it is common for negotiators to start high in proposals to give space for coming down during the talks, these maximalist demands suggest that Russia is counting on international support waning and its military pressure against Ukraine working. Essentially, the approach they are taking indicates that the Kremlin believes a slow, coercive strategy will enable them to minimize their concessions while maximizing gains.

The logic of such an approach is now in greater question after the success of Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web. The Ukrainian government assessed that their coordinated drone strikes disabled 34% of Russia’s strategic aircraft fleet and resulted in nearly USD 7 billion in damages. More than the material impact, the degradation of one component of Russia’s nuclear triad has much further security implications for the Kremlin than a mere elimination of tactical level targets along the battle line. Further, given that the operation included the use of unwitting Russian truck drivers and operating locations deep in Russian territory, it also introduces practical and psychological costs, in that Russian security forces now have to monitor domestic transportation routes and vehicles throughout the country.

But the remaining wildcard here is international support for Ukraine. While the Kremlin may estimate that it can outlast Ukrainian attacks, this is predicated on how much pressure Ukraine’s partners impose on Russia and how much aid they continue to deliver to Kyiv. In any negotiation, the fundamental levers of influence come from creating value (incentive) and claiming value (coercion), and the Kremlin has illustrated that incentives will not curb their maximalist demands. Thus, what happens with regard to international support to Ukraine will likely be the most influential variable between now and the next round of ceasefire negotiations, whenever and wherever they may occur.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is a seasoned international negotiator and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. He is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. Michael is a former East-West Center Fellow, a military veteran, and the author of “Negotiate: A Primer for Practitioners.”