India's Indus Treaty and its abeyance
- Neeraj Singh Manhas
- 1 day ago
- 5 min read
The 1960’s Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which divided six rivers between India and Pakistan and guaranteed that both nations shared these essential water resources, has been a significant agreement for the past 65 years. However, following a deadly terrorist attack in Pahalgam that claimed 26 lives, including both civilians and soldiers, India decided to suspend the treaty on April 23, 2025. India has taken this action in an effort to put pressure on Pakistan to act against terrorist organisations, and in response, the prime minister of Pakistan warned that any attempt to halt or redirect water from the Indus would be viewed as an act of war warranting full retaliation. Beyond the specter of violence, there are significant risks associated with this suspension, such as strained relations, environmental harm, and threats to water security. Although it demonstrates India’s firm position, that nothing will be taken casually in the name of cross border terrorism that sabotages India’s national sovereignty.
Brokered by the World Bank, the IWT is a rare testament to cooperation between rival nations. It allocates the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, roughly 20 percent of the Indus system’s water (33 million acre-feet annually)—to India, while Pakistan relies on the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—for 80 percent (135 million acre-feet). This arrangement has endured wars in 1965 and 1971, the 1999 Kargil conflict, and countless skirmishes. After the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks, India hinted at revisiting the treaty, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi declaring, “Blood and water can’t flow together.” Those warnings materialized in 2023-2024, when India issued notices for treaty modification, citing demographic and environmental needs.
Now, the Pahalgam attack, linked to seven terrorists, including four to five from Pakistan, has pushed India to act decisively. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced the treaty’s “abeyance” until Pakistan “credibly abjures” terrorism, halting water flow data sharing, joint inspections, and cooperation under the Permanent Indus Commission.
Graphical representation of the incident area in which the Pahalgam terrorist attack occurred
This suspension is a geopolitical earthquake. For Pakistan, the Indus system irrigates 80 percent of its farmland, supporting 21 percent of its GDP and 45 percent of its workforce. Halting regulated releases from India’s dams, such as the 330 MW Kishanganga Dam or the under-construction 850 MW Ratle Dam, could disrupt sowing seasons in Punjab and Sindh, where water scarcity already threatens livelihoods. Pakistan’s stock market plummeted 2.12 percent on April 24, reflecting investor fears of economic fallout. In contrast, India stands to gain by accelerating hydroelectric and irrigation projects in the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh regions–such as the Shahpurkandi dam–to harness its untapped 20 percent share. Yet, India currently underutilizes its allocated waters, letting them flow to Pakistan, and bureaucratic delays could blunt the suspension’s strategic edge.
Legally, India’s move navigates a gray area. The IWT lacks an exit clause, and declaring it “in abeyance” may violate international law. India may find legal grounding in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), while simultaneously asserting that its national sovereignty will not be held hostage to an outdated agreement. Similarly, Article 60 of the Vienna Convention allows a party to suspend or terminate a treaty in response to a “material breach” by the other party. India might argue that Pakistan’s alleged failure to curb terrorism or cooperate effectively under the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms constitutes such a breach. For instance, India has long accused Pakistan of obstructing hydroelectric projects on its share of the rivers, which the IWT permits, through frivolous objections. Furthermore, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides for treaty suspension or termination due to a “fundamental change of circumstances” that radically alters the treaty’s obligations. India could point to evolving realities—such as the impacts of climate change on the Indus basin, increasing domestic water demands, or heightened security threats—as justifying a revaluation of the treaty. These arguments, while legally contentious amid the decision’s ties to the Pahalgam terrorist attack, offer India a framework to challenge the IWT’s immutability. Beyond legal maneuvering, India’s move is deeply rooted in its assertion of national sovereignty.
In the case of Pakistan, it has already signalled plans to seek arbitration, as it did over India’s Kishanganga and Ratle dams in 2016 and 2023. India’s recent refusal to engage in neutral expert reviews or arbitration complicates matters, signalling a rejection of the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms. This stance could embolden Pakistan to escalate the issue globally, framing India as an unreliable upper riparian state. Meanwhile, the World Bank, a guarantor of the treaty, faces a delicate balancing act as its mediation role risks being undermined if India holds firm in its positions.
The Chenab River (photo via Bluesaffire on Wikimedia Commons)
Environmentally, the suspension of obligations under the IWT raises alarming risks. In Pakistan, reduced water flows could deplete groundwater reserves, harm crops, and exacerbate an existing water crisis that affects 80 percent of its population. Punjab’s fertile plains, often called Pakistan’s breadbasket, could face desertification if upstream releases falter. In India, accelerated dam construction to utilize its water share risks disrupting river ecosystems in Jammu and Kashmir. The Chenab and Jhelum rivers support biodiversity, including migratory fish and wetlands, which could suffer from altered flows. The Indus basin, shared with China and Afghanistan, is a delicate ecological web, and unilateral actions could set a dangerous precedent. For instance, China, an upstream stakeholder in the Indus and Brahmaputra, might restrict India’s water access in retaliation, escalating regional tensions.
Furthermore, diplomatically, the suspension threatens India’s global standing. As an upper riparian state, India has long projected itself as a responsible steward of shared resources. Suspending the IWT could erode this image, but India is all set and ready for a bold retaliation to demonstrate that there will be no compromise on Islamist terrorism that challenges India’s sovereignty. In response, Pakistan has already worked to garner support from allies like China, where discourse has spread across social media platforms like Weibo, Douyin, and WeChat at a large scale.
To make this strategy effective, India must act decisively yet prudently. Fast-tracking
projects like the 624 MW Kiru and 1,000 MW Pakal Dul dams can boost power and irrigation in Jammu and Kashmir. Publicly, India should frame the suspension as a last resort, emphasizing its restraint in not fully stopping natural flows which continue to reach Pakistan. For Pakistan, the pressure to curb terrorism is undeniable, but economic collapse from water shortages could fuel instability, potentially backfiring on India.
Through this all, both nations share a common challenge. The Indus is not just a resource but a lifeline for 300 million people across the basin, and the decisions developments yet to unfold in the coming time will have much further reaching implications than the present security crisis.
Neeraj Singh Manhas is Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He has authored and edited six books and has various research interests covering Sino-Indian border issues; Transboundary Rivers; Water security; and Defence studies. He tweets on X (formerly Twitter) as @The_China_Chap.
